From Commitment to Committees by Tallacchini, Mariachiara (ORCID:0000-0003-3730-3673)




M A R I A C H I A R A  T A L L A C C H I N I
IN the last few decades ethics has
become a source of legitimization in
implementing science and technology
policies in so-called knowledgebased
societies and economies.1 In western
countries, ethics has become a politi-
cal instrument to normalize innova-
tion by supposedly neutralizing social
choices on science and technology,
and by making them accepted by
citizens without any direct citizen
involvement in the decision-making
process. In this sense, ethics has been
framed as a soft legal tool aimed at
facilitating the implementation of
technoscience.
The major assumptions of this
construction are the following: values
involved in technoscientific policies
may be rationally clarified by experts’
ethical judgments; and, equally,
experts’ ethical opinions may repre-
sent citizens’ values. Thus, not only
are citizens alienated from political
choices about science and technology,
but they are also told that this correctly
happens because rational, ordered,
and unbiased committee procedures
may efficiently replace their personal
concerns about the directions taken by
innovative technologies.
During the series of meetings
about ‘The Knowledge Society
Debates’ that took place in January
2009 in India, it was observed that the
rhetoric of ethical discourse as a for-
mal strategy to legitimize science and
technology does not really belong to
Indian institutions and society. India
certainly has its own tradition of insti-
tutional medical ethics. The Indian
Committee for Medical Research
(ICMR) is one of the oldest medical
research bodies in the world.2 But
what emerged from the discussions
was that discourses about societal
values and value-laden questions con-
cerning scientific and technological
development are still strongly per-
ceived and conceived of as political
problems raising direct civil society
concern and commitment, primarily
through the spontaneous participation
and engagement of a variety of non-
governmental organizations.
However, in the process of glo-
balization of which India is a part, the
extensive use of ethics – or ‘ethics’ in
quotes, to refer to the bureaucratic use
of values in the domain of science,
technology, and the market – is likely
1. S. Jasanoff, Designs on Nature, Princeton
University Press, Princeton NJ, 2005;
B. Wynne, U. Felt et al., ‘Taking European
Knowledge Society Seriously’, European
Commission DG Research Science, Economy
and Society, Brussels, 2007.
2. The formation of ICMR dates back to 1911
when the Government of India set up the
Indian Research Fund Association (IRFA) to
coordinate medical research in the country.
In 1949, it was redesignated as ICMR with
considerably expanded scope of functions.
ICMR has a bioethics cell which coordinates
all activities related to ethical issues pertain-
ing to medical research on humans and ani-
mals in India. See N.J. Denta and A. Krishan,
‘Ethics Committees in India’, Quality
Assurance Journal 11, 2007, pp. 143-150;
N.R. Madhava Menon, ‘Medicine, Ethics and
the Law’, Indian Journal of Medical Ethics,
January-March 2008, pp. 31-32.
3S E M I N A R  5 9 7  –  M a y  2 0 0 9
to become very common and affect
Indian institutions and the society to
some extent.3 
In this process, the hope is that
certain specific features of Indian civil
society and institutional cultures4 –
such as the Gandhian legacy of civic
commitment, the long-standing tradi-
tion of numerous diversities coexist-
ing in society, and the large number
of civil society organizations – will
help to maintain a more critical and
less passive approach towards the
risks that ‘ethics’ may involve: the
disembedding of values from citizens’
and communities’ real lives, and their
reframing through de-vitalized expert
opinions. In this sense, citizens’ commit-
ment is officially replaced by experts’
committees.
In what follows I will analyze
some steps in this process of con-
structing EU ethics, sketching out
how the constant call for objectivity
in ethics has gone along with citizens’
(and their representatives’) moral
disempowerment and with the colo-
nization of morality by governmental
powers.
The renewed interest in applied eth-
ics and the official birth of bioethics
in the late sixties have been explained
in various ways.5 However, the differ-
ent narratives seem to share at least
one explanatory factor, namely the
need for a more intense and open dia-
logue between science and society;
and the need to ground the self-refer-
ential ethics of science in a socially
agreed vision of values and choices.
The institutionalization of eth-
ics produced a strong distortion of
these original needs. The creation of
ethics committees and commissions,
as a valid method of decision-making
to find out the ‘right’ values, trans-
formed the ongoing pluralist and inter-
disciplinary dialogue that was at the
core of so-called ‘public ethics’ into
the bureaucratized mechanisms of
expert advice derived from scientific
committees’ procedures.
Institutionalized ethics was started in
the European Communities in the
field of biotechnology and in connec-
tion with the development of the bio-
technological industry. Here the idea
of ethics as a derivative of social
issues has been accompanied by the
identification and isolation of ‘what
an ethical issue is’, namely by the con-
struction of a well-defined instrument
to govern on and through values.6
In April 1991, a few months
before the first European ethics advi-
sory body was appointed, the Euro-
pean Commission addressed the issue
of ethics in a communication to the
Parliament and the Council. The title
of the document was clear in indicat-
ing why and in which context ethics
was needed: ‘Promoting the Competi-
tive Environment for the Industrial
Activities Based on Biotechnology
within the Community.’7 
In discussing what could be done
in order to successfully implement
biotechnology in Europe, the commis-
sion analyzed and discarded the pro-
posals supporting the introduction of
a broad social assessment of new
biotechnology, which would add the
question about social benefits to the
already existing criteria of safety,
quality and efficacy. The main reason
against a wide public discussion of
biotechnology was envisaged by the
commission in the ‘imperative’ to
‘avoid a situation creating uncer-
tainty’, which ‘could result in a diver-
sion of investment and could act as a
disincentive for innovation and tech-
nological development by industry.’8 
The rule stating that decisions
have to be based upon ‘objective
assessments using clearly identified
criteria’ was the preamble to introduc-
ing the new dedicated ethics body.
More importantly, the commis-
sion directly associated this necessity
with the importance of avoiding the
uncertainty of a confused public
debate, with the risk of adversely
influencing industrial development:
‘The questions arising in public debate
belong to distinct categories and
debate will continue to be ill-defined
(and for public policy purposes, inef-
fectual) so long as a clear differentia-
tion is not made between these
issues.’9 The issues waiting for differ-
3. The recent decision of the Indian IT indus-
try body, National Association of Software and
Services Companies (Nasscom), to form a
corporate governance and ethics committee
to strengthen corporate governance practices
in India in the wake of the Satyam Computer
controversy, is an example of ethics as a legiti-
mizing regulatory tool. See NewKerala.com,
http://www.newkerala.com/topstory-
fullnews-91146.html, 11 February 2009.
4. S. Visvanathan, A Carnival for Science:
Essays on Science, Technology and Develop-
ment, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1997.
5. N.S. Jecker, A.R. Jonsen, R.A. Pearlman,
Bioethics: An Introduction to the History,
Methods, and Practice, Jones and Bartlett
Publishers, Sudbury Ma., 1997; M.L. Tina
Stevens, Bioethics in America: Origins and
Cultural Politics, Johns Hopkins University
Press, Baltimore, 2000.
6. In a quite similar way, in the US the need
for a dedicated permanent bioethical body
was explored in two main documents by OTA
in 1993 and IOM in 1995, which identified
what an ‘ethical issue’ is (US Congress, Office
of Technology Assessment, ‘Biomedical
Ethics in US Public Policy – Background
Paper’, OTA-BP-BBS-1O5., US Government
Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1993; R.E.
Bulger, E. Meyer Bobby, and H.V. Fineberg
(eds), Society’s Choices: Social and Ethical
Decision Making in Biomedicine, Committee
on the Social and Ethical Impacts of Develop-
ments in Biomedicine, Institute of Medicine,
National Academy Press, Washington DC,
1995.
7. Commission Communication to Parliament
and the Council, ‘Promoting the Competitive
Environment for the Industrial Activities
Based on Biotechnology Within the Commu-
nity’, SEC (91) 629 final, Brussels, 1991.
8. Ibid., p. 8.
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entiation were identified as the ethi-
cal considerations relating to human
life and ‘other values’, namely animal
welfare, environmental issues, health
and safety related issues, transpar-
ency, and socio-economic impacts.
In November 1991, the Group
of Advisers on the Ethical Implica-
tions of Biotechnology (GAEIB)
was established. This was the ‘official’
beginning of the European politics of
ethics – the decision to incorporate
ethics in the decision-making process
concerning biotechnology (and later
all applications of science and tech-
nology).10 
The rise of ethics represented a fun-
damental political factor in the shift
from the ECSC Treaty of 1953 and the
Single Market of 1991, to the Treaty
of Maastricht in 1993.11 Though eth-
ics and cultural values are predomi-
nantly regulated at the national level,
the GAEIB was appointed to integrate
science in society. ‘European integra-
tion must mean more than establish-
ing a single market; progress in
science and technology must be given
a human, social and ethical dimen-
sion, otherwise European citizenship
cannot be established.’12 
Ethics has thus become an
important legitimizing factor in the
construction of a political European
Community – the shift from a prima-
rily economic to a political organiza-
tion. The roles of ethics included the
need ‘…to identify and define the
ethical issues raised by biotechno-
logy; to assess, from the ethical view-
point, the impact of the Community’s
activities in the field of biotechno-
logy; to advise the Commission, in
the exercise of its powers, on the ethi-
cal aspects of biotechnology and to
ensure that the general public is kept
properly informed.’13 
The willingness to use ethics as a
manifestation of indirect involvement
of the public in the decision-making
process and as a symbolic move
toward a qualitatively different vision
of the European Community seems
to put an emphasis on the role of civil
society in building a broader political
community. Values are a metaphoric
reference to the civil society, to histo-
rical heritage, to rooted communities,
to a non-bureaucratic but spontaneous
level of organization. Talking of eth-
ics and allowing ethical values to be
part of the decision-making process,
European institutions suggest they
represent society as a whole and
present themselves as a political com-
munity, or even a polity.
But ethics has only symbolically
been evoked for democratic involve-
ment and has not been implemented
accordingly. In 1997, the new group
replacing GAEIB, the European
Group on Ethics in Science and New
Technologies (EGE), was appointed,
and its mandate renewed in 2001 and
2005. EGE was given a broader man-
date to cover all areas of the applica-
tion of science and technology, but its
characteristics were increasingly
shaped like those of an expert commit-
tee. Citizens are no longer evoked and
the only public round table still men-
tioned in the mandate is only open to
other experts.
The identification of ‘the ethical
values of all Europeans’ never included
EU citizens, but remained the task of
appointed expert committees to facili-
tate the functioning of the market.
Since its institutional start, EU
‘ethics’ has acquired some distinct
features that have been consolidated
over time. Some of these characterize
several existing ‘ethics’ regulatory
tools, but others are specific to EU
‘ethics’, revealing the structural insti-
tutional elements they depend on and
the functions played by ‘ethics’ in the
EU context.
The development and shaping
of ethical discourse in the EU may be
seen as a constant attempt to endow
‘ethics’ with features generally refer-
ring to objectivity as the main value
standing for rationality and unbiased
judgment.14 The law and the legal
process have represented both the
terms of reference and the differential
elements to consolidate ‘ethics’. On
the one hand, ‘ethics’ imitates the pro-
cedural elements of the law, which are
part of its structural public reliability.
On the other hand it keeps the distance
from the legal process, being adver-
tised as a rational decision-making
tool and a way to speed up the law. In
this way ‘ethics’ has become a formal
requirement specifically mentioned
in many directives as a procedural step
with the role of providing a broad
sense of societal legitimacy.
Some specific elements are
shown as indicators of objectivity:
ethics as a committee procedure, as
expert and outsourced knowledge,
and as depending on subsidiarity.
In the EU ‘knowledge society’
science and technology do not simply
9. Ibid., p. 11.
10. ‘Commission decision on the renewal
of the mandate of the European Group on
Ethics in Science and New Technologies’, 11
May 2005, (2005/383/EC), Official Journal
of the European Union L 127/19, 20/5/2005.
11. This page, as others listed below, no longer
exists and has been retrieved through the




html. Accessed 24 March 2009.
12. http://ec.europa.eu/european_group_
ethics/archive/1991_1997/bilan_en.htm.
Accessed 24 March 2009.
13. http://ec.europa.eu/european_group_ eth-
ics/archive/1991_1997/organisation_en.htm.
Accessed 24 March 2009.
14. Y. Ezrahi, The Descent of Icarus, Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1990.
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represent one among other tasks for
policy and regulation, but a founding
political principle providing both
ends and means, as they are the source
for effective methods and efficiency
values. The transfer of some proce-
dures from the scientific community
to ethics has been a strategy to make
the ethical discourse seem to be
founded on knowledge, and hence
more ‘objective’.
Committees are part of the rhe-
toric of expert knowledge; they may
refer to plurality and multidiscipli-
narity as to their composition; they
may be played to perform neutrally,
as their procedures tend to create
generally agreed and de-personalized
opinions.
Scientific expertise procedures and
committee procedures have converged
in providing ethics both with theoreti-
cal validation – in the EU language:
‘the science of ethics’ – 15 and bureau-
cratic legitimization.16 In fact, focus-
ing solely on the ‘ethical’ dimension
of scientific and technological issues
as opposed to the broad socio-politi-
cal and economic ones was a way to
emphasize and rely on ‘the presuppo-
sitions of rationality upon which the
debate is conducted.’17 
The ‘outsourcing of values’ also
contributes to the institutional fram-
ing of moral and social choices as a
matter of neutral expertise and tech-
nical knowledge. Values are not per-
ceived as an integral part of European
legislation but are supplied through
specialized knowledge; this is analo-
gous to other fields of expertise. In this
way, the substantive content of direc-
tives and regulations touching on val-
ues does not really involve any value
judgment. Instead, it consists of incor-
porating ethical knowledge into laws
as an external expertise, sometimes
consisting of the mere awareness that
no general agreements can be reached
on the subject.
Inherently political decisions may
thus be neutralized and depoliticized
through deference to expert opinions,
although the ad personam experts’
appointment procedure shows, on the
contrary, that ethics performed by
committees may be considered as
‘commissioned ethics’ and a ‘com-
missioning of ethics’; namely, it is
ethics on demand. Whereas this does
not necessarily imply a direct choice
of the relevant values, the extraction
of the ethical dimensions from an
issue to be regulated always involves
a pre-framing of the issue itself and of
what is important, and the inevitable
reduction of value-laden issues to
their mere ‘ethical implications’.
Subsidiarity, nevertheless, re-
mains the major feature of EU ‘ethi-
cal method’. Subsidiarity is the
principle – established by Article 5(2)
of the European Convention –18
whereby the Union does not take ac-
tion (except in the areas which fall
within its exclusive competence)
unless it is more effective than action
taken at national, regional or local
level, in order ‘to ensure that decisions
are taken as closely as possible to the
citizens of the Union.’ Ethics is a mat-
ter of subsidiarity.
‘Ethics’ belonging to member
states means that harmonization
cannot be reached in this field and that
a multiplicity of moral visions have to
coexist (as both the GAEIB and the
EGE had to recognize on several
occasions). Subsidiarity allows differ-
ent ethical choices to coexist and be
compatible within EU legislation,
preventing the EU from being frag-
mented by ethical dilemmas in the
coordination of different state-based
ethics.
However, though a clearly stated
principle allowing member states’
subjectivities to make sovereign
decisions about values, subsidiarity
has also been referred to as a matter
of objectivity.
Ethics and subsidiarity have been
intimately connected from the very
beginning of the European integra-
tion process. In his 1989 Discours de
Bruges, Jacques Delors has described
subsidiarity as the practical way
to make possible ‘l’émergence de
l’Europe unie et la fidélité à notre
nation’ (the emergence of a united
Europe and the faithfulness to
our nation); he also saw the role of
‘ethics’ as providing the symbolic
dimension to reconcile the state and
individuals: ‘Au-delà d’un nationa-
lisme triomphant et d’un individua-
lisme exacerbé, l’éthique revient en
force’19 (beyond a triumphant nation-
alism and an extreme individualism,
ethics has to be strengthened again).
Subsidiarity and community ethics
are thus strongly connected terms,
as the former concept ‘stems from a
traditional society organized in com-
munities to which each person “natu-
rally” belonged;’ where ‘naturally’
15. See http://ec.europa.eu/research/science-
society/index.cfm?fuseaction= public.topic&
id=74 Accessed 24 March 2009.
16. T. Larsson, ‘Precooking in the European
Union – the World of Expert Groups’,
Finansdepartementet ESO Studies, http://
www.regeringen.se/sb/d/4997/a/36305, 2003,
Accessed 24 March 2009; B. Salter and
M. Jones, ‘Biobanks and Bioethics: The Poli-
tics of Legitimation’, Journal of European
Public Policy 12, 2006, pp. 710-732.
17. J-C. Galloux, A. Thing Mortensen, S. de
Cheveigné, A. Allansdottir, A. Chatjouli and
G. Sakellaris, ‘The Institutions of Bioethics’,
in M.W. Bauer and G.Gaskell (eds.), Biotech-
nology: The Making of a Global Controversy,
Cambridge University Press, London, 2002,
pp. 135-136.
18. Protocol (No 30) on the Application of
the Principle of Subsidiarity and Proportion-
ality, Amsterdam, 2 October 1997.
19. J. Delors, ‘Discours de Bruges 21.10.1989’,
in Discours de Jacques Delors, Europe Docu-
ments 1576, 1-8.
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means that the individual was feel-
ing this belonging as a part of him-
self, as a fundamental element of his
humanity.20 
However, in today’s context, the
subsidiarized construction of values
in the EU may respect member states’
will in their relationships within the
EU, but it certainly deprives citizens
of the ability to express their own
views, whenever their visions are not
subsumed by member states’ sover-
eign ethics. From the citizens’ points
of view, this way of framing ethical
deliberation, though making the
sovereign power of ‘national ethics’
stronger, does not represent them but
only the states’ ethics – literally, the
ethics-of-the-states.
Also, subsidiarity about values
is a challenge to European legislation
and the European Parliament as the
main institution directly representing
European citizens.
Notwithstanding, in a recent
debate during the approval of so-
called advanced therapies products21
involving embryonic cells, the mem-
bers of the European Parliament
themselves reinforced the idea that
subsidiarity is a matter of objectivity
in ethical issues.
There is ‘no room in the text
for personal ethical views,’ 22 one
representative said. ‘Any self-styled
ethical objections are completely
overthrown by the fact that the inde-
pendence of the member states guar-
antees them the power to impose
restrictions on research,’ another com-
mented.23 Members of Parliament’s
opinions, the majority argued, being
‘subjective’, namely expressing their
personal subjective views, cannot
‘objectively’ represent ‘public moral-
ity’, which only member states are
entitled to embody. The objectivity
of subsidiarity is de facto a sort of
European ‘ethical sustainability’ or
‘ethical coexistence’ among sover-
eign states.
In this paper I argue that the EU
construction of ethics as a politically
legitimizing factor, has primarily been
inspired by the restless quest for
objectivity. The objectivity of ethics
started with its nature of isolated and
purified discourse on values; it pro-
ceeded through the appeal to commit-
tee procedures and expert knowledge;
and, now, member states’ public
morality has become a synonym for
objectivity about values.
Among the approaches to pro-
viding legitimacy for the EU integra-
tion process, two different methods
have been described by some scho-
lars of public policy: one frames
Europe as a community based on
common values; the other conceives
of it as a sui generis polity going
beyond inter-governmentalism and
based on rights. In the former case,
Europe is seen ‘as a community in
which the different national modes
of allegiance and identification are
to be harmonized. The success of the
EU depends upon developing a shared
identity and a value basis for integrat-
ing different conceptions of the good
life, and a diverse range of societal
interests.’24 
In the latter, the EU is ‘in need
of direct legitimization and a firmer
basis of popular participation than the
one provided for by the democratic
processes at the state level. Here, the
integration process hinges on the abil-
ity to establish a fair system of coope-
ration founded on basic rights and
democratic procedures for delibera-
tion and decision-making.’25 
The compulsive enforcement of
top-down ethics has been associated
with a misleading conception of
objectivity, whereas ethics has been
managed in the EU more as a tool to
exert power in a self-legitimatizing
way than as an exercise of democratic
sharing.
From this perspective, on the con-
trary, ‘subjectivity’ would actually
mean that citizens and their repre-
sentatives may express themselves
and exert their rights and powers: a
concept of ‘subjectivity’ that reso-
nates with the fundamentals of the
state under the rule of law. It has
been observed that in the EU integra-
tion process, though citizens have
achieved rights they have not been
able to give them a coherent frame.
The lack of a European collective
identity and the absence of a unifying
public sphere for identity-formation
of the European citizens are the main
reasons for the democratic deficit
in the EU. The EU as a ‘process of
unfinished democratization’26 requires
less ‘ethics’ and more comprehensive
and convincing processes towards
constitutionalization and citizens’
participation.
20. Y. Soudan, ‘Subsidiarity and Community
in Europe’, Ethical Perspectives 5, 1998,
p. 180.
21. Regulation (EC) No 1394/2007 of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 13
November 2007 on advanced therapy medici-
nal products and amending Directive 2001/83/
EC.
22. Adamos Adamou, on behalf of the GUE/
NGL Group, http://www.europarl. europa.eu/
o e i l / F i n d B y P r o c n u m . d o ? l a n g = 2 &
procnum=COD/2005/0227. Accessed 24
March 2009.
23. Marco Cappato (ALDE), in writing, Italy,
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/FindBy
Procnum.do?lang=2&procnum=COD/2005/
0227. Accessed 24 March 2009.
24. E.O. Eriksen and J.E. Fossum, ‘Europe
in Search of Legitimacy: Strategies of Legiti-
mation Assessed’, International Political
Science Review 25, 2004, p. 437.
25. Ibid., p. 438.
26. E.O. Eriksen, Citizenship and Demo-
cratic Legitimacy in the EU, Final Report.
EUR23114, Brussels, 2005, p. 13.
